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Abstract
The Varieties of Capitalism literature posits that national economic institutions reect the
mode of coordination of a country’s market actors. Despite the importance of this claim
and a rich literature on the emergence of regulatory capitalism, few studies test such pre-
diction for Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs). This article connects the two elds of
research by analysing the impact of economic coordination on the formal independence of
IRAs. The results show that, beyond issues of credible commitment and policy stability, the
collective action capacity of market actors matters. In particular, regulators in Coordinated
Market Economies enjoy less independence than in Liberal Market Economies, while interme-
diate regimes grant IRAs the least autonomy. The policy implications are nontrivial. Similar
to other macroeconomic institutions, inappropriate combinations of economic coordination
and IRA independence may engender Pareto-suboptimal regulatory solutions. In such cases,
policymakers should reconsider the rules governing national regulators.
Keywords: agency, coordination, independence, regulation, varieties of capitalism.
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1 INTRODUCTION
During the past 20 years, two important literatures have appeared to explain fun-
damental aspects of advanced political economies. First, the Varieties of Capitalism
(VoC) approach, developed by political economists Hall and Soskice (2001), applies the
new economics of organization to themacroeconomy to distinguish between capitalist
economies by reference to the ways economic actors coordinate their actions. Accord-
ing to this approach, nations cluster into identiable groups based on the extent to
which rms rely on market (Liberal Market Economies, LMEs), strategic (Coordinated
Market Economies, CMEs) or intermediate, often state-led modes of coordination.
Concomitantly, a vast literature has emerged on the rise of regulated capitalism (Ma-
jone 1994; Levi-Faur 2005; Gilardi 2008; Jordana et al. 2011). Market-liberalizing pro-
cesses, such as deregulation and privatization, have been accompanied by the spread
of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in policy elds as diverse as telecommu-
nications, competition enforcement, energy, food safety, environment. Part of this
variegated literature endeavors to explain why the degree of independence of IRAs
(formal or actual) varies between countries or sectors (Gilardi 2002, 2005, 2008; Elgie
& McMenamin 2005; Maggetti 2007; Hanretty & Koop 2013; Thatcher 2002a). Within
this subset, few studies investigate the impact of a country’s political economy on the
setup of its IRAs. Only three nd any connection at all (Thatcher 2007; Maggetti 2007;
Guidi 2014).
In this articlewe establish a link between the VoC and IRAs literatures by assessing
whether economic coordination inuences the de iure (formal) independence of regu-
latory agencies, that is, the political act of delegation to an IRA. With such analysis, we
venture into uncharted territory: not only the connections between the two literatures
are undertheorized, but also both approaches have mostly relied on comparative case
studies. Mainly due to measurement problems, large-N statistical analyses are only
gradually being developed (Hall & Gingerich 2009, p. 450; Gilardi 2008, p. 8).
We develop and test competing hypotheses on the importance of VoC for the inde-
pendence of regulatory agencies, stemming from Thatcher’s (2007) insight that there
is coupling between economic systems and regulatory regimes. Our two pairs of hy-
potheses link two measures of economic coordination to regulatory independence. In
the rst, we posit that there is a linear relationship between the mode of coordination
in corporate governance (the extent to which rms are nested in corporate networks,
which is a proxy for the degree of ‘liberalism’ in an economy) and agency indepen-
dence. In the second, we employ coordination in the labor market as a more rened
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measure of the collective action capacity of economic actors. This allows us to dis-
tinguish between LMEs, CMEs and intermediate cases, which dierentiate themselves
from the ‘extremes’. We hypothesize that, in contrast to existing literature on IRAs, but
in line with the literature on other types of delegation (including VoC), policy-makers
not only take into account the capacity of regulators (the politicians themselves) to
generate credible policy, but also the ability of regulatees (rms in primis) to send
credible signals, when deciding on how to delegate. To use a favorite metaphor in the
literature, we think that lashing to the mast equally depends on Ulysses and his crew,
as it does on the Sirens, whose singing may or may not lure unwary sailors on to rocks.
The study recalculates two measures of coordination, developed by Hall and Gin-
gerich (2009), and applies them to Gilardi’s (2005) dataset of Western European regu-
latory agencies. We nd a statistically signicant and robust relationship between IRA
independence and coordination in the labor market. Our results show that where em-
ployers coordinate via market-based mechanisms (LMEs) IRAs are more independent
than where there is strategic coordination (CMEs). More interestingly, we nd out
that agencies in intermediately coordinated economic systems tend to display lower
degrees of independence. This may reect the traditional negotiating or mediating
role played by the state in these economies to supplant the incapacity of rms to send
credible regulatory signals.
These ndings provide further evidence that IRAs may be a constitutive part of the
VoC architecture, and that this is reected in their formal operational rules. Collab-
orative and less independent regulatory agencies are probably an institutional com-
plementarity to strategic or intermediate coordination. By virtue of this, rms, either
among themselves or through the intermediation of the state, can negotiate impor-
tant aspects of regulation. On the contrary, where market coordination dominates,
regulated competition, which requires a high degree of regulatory autonomy, is the
norm.
The policy implications are nontrivial. Contrary to previous scholarship, which
ascribed the deviations from standard recommendations from international organi-
zations, such as the OECD, to set up independent regulators to political factors, this
study shows that also economic coordination matters. Hence, and similar to other
macroeconomic institutions, dierent varieties of capitalism may require varying de-
grees of regulatory agency independence in order to produce Pareto-ecient solutions.
As decision-making (in our case the act of delegation) happens under bounded ratio-
nality, policy-makers are imperfectly informed on the interaction between economic
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actors and IRAs. In case this produces suboptimal regulation, decision-makers may
take stock and adapt the rules governing their country’s regulatory agencies.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a short literature review with
a special focus on the existing attempts at connecting the VoC and IRA approaches.
Section 3 illustrates the main hypotheses as well as their theoretical underpinnings.
Section 4 presents the data used to operationalize our explanatory variables. Section
5 expounds the statistical analysis. Section 6 discusses the results and double-checks
them with qualitative case studies. Section 7 concludes.
2 REGULATORY AGENCIES AND VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM
2.1 The literature on Independent Regulatory Agencies: where we
stand
The rise of regulatory capitalismhas generated abundant andmultifaceted research. Its
institutional manifestation are IRAs, dened as public organizations with regulatory
powers that are neither elected by the people, nor directlymanaged by elected ocials
(Thatcher& Stone Sweet 2002, p. 2). IRAs soon became a favored subject of scholarship
that mainly deals with three topics: their origins, their impact on decision-making and
their implications for democratic legitimacy (Gilardi 2008, p. 22).
This article engages with the literature on the establishment of regulatory agen-
cies, so their formal independence, and the variation in their institutional character-
istics across economic systems. Here we focus on two main aspects dealt with in the
literature: the factors inuencing the degree of formal autonomy of IRAs, and the re-
lationship between formal (de iure) and actual (de facto) independence.
With respect to the factors determining formal independence, Gilardi’s work (2005,
2008) is themost exhaustive. He emphasizes three explicantia. First, politicians need to
increase the credibility of policy commitments to attract investment. Decision-makers
bind themselves to increase the time consistency of policies against changes in their
own preferences. Moreover, certain sectors are more sensitive than others, and Gilardi
shows that utilities require more independent IRAs than social sectors. Second, politi-
cal uncertainty, that is, frequent and/or dramatic alternation in government, may also
lead to time inconsistency of policy choices. Hence, countries that are politically more
unstable display, on average, higher degrees of IRA independence. Finally, a coun-
try’s institutional conguration also matters. Many checks and balances render policy
change less likely, thereby not requiring highly autonomous IRAs. Hence, veto players
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can be seen as functional equivalents of delegation.
Even though these explanatory factors are valid, we think that they refer to the reg-
ulator’s side of the delegation equation (the political system’s characteristics) and deal
only in part with the regulatees (they account solely for sectoral dierences). By not
controlling for the economic environment that IRAs are supposed to regulate, within a
European reality of highly divergent national modes of capitalism (see Thatcher 2002a,
2007), one risks to neglect important country-specic factors. Given the regulators’
role in mitigating market failures, this study explores concurrent explanantia that re-
fer to the regulatees’ side of delegation, that is to the characteristics of the rms that
are the object of regulation and their capacity to self-regulate.
Another important aspect of IRAs is the interaction between their formal and ac-
tual independence. On the one hand, politicians may respect formal independence for
several reasons: to further increase the credibility of long-term policy commitments;
to use IRAs as a blame-shifting instrument, e.g. if something goes wrong; or because
they nd it counterproductive to interfere with organizations placed at arm’s length.
On the other hand, in institutional frameworks allowing for some discretion, agen-
cies develop their own strategies and preferences. Their leeway is either enhanced or
diminished by the practice of the law, which may diverge from the text of the law. Fi-
nally, a number of non-legal factors inuence actual independence: the age of an IRA,
the political salience of its tasks, successful bureaucratic practices and so on (Maggetti
2007; Hanretty & Koop 2013, p. 3).
So, the literature is divided. Among the studies relevant for this article, Maggetti
(2007, p. 271), who employs a fuzzy-set QCA to investigate 16 regulatory agencies
in 10 Western European countries and three sectors, contends that “High formal in-
dependence [is] neither a necessary nor a sucient condition for a high level of de
facto independence from politicians”. In contrast, Hanretty and Koop (2013, p. 13), in a
broader study, which analyzes IRAs in seven sectors and 17 Western European coun-
tries, write that “Formal independence, contra skeptical predictions, turn[s] out to be
a signicant predictor of actual independence.”
As far as this article is concerned, we decide to set the issue of de facto indepen-
dence aside. While we acknowledge that the relationship between economic systems
and informal operational rules of IRAs is worth exploring, we prefer to start from for-
mal independence, for three main reasons. First, the statutes of the agencies are the
main ‘variable’ that politicians can change through legislation, and also the easiest to
measure across countries and sectors. Second, while on the operationalization of for-
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mal independence there is a broad consensus in the literature, de facto independence
has been empirically analyzed only in two studies that employ dierent indicators.
Third, no large dataset on de facto independence is available, as opposed to formal
independence.
2.2 Modes of economic coordination and agency independence:
what relationship?
There are few studies that explicitly link the literature on IRAs and on VoC: two are
quantitative analyses focussing on more than one country (Hanretty & Koop 2012;
Guidi 2014), one employs a QCA analysis (Maggetti 2007), one is a quantitative com-
parison of Independent Administrative Authorities in France (Elgie & McMenamin
2005), so, less relevant for our study. Lastly, Thatcher (2007) provides an exhaustive
account in a qualitative comparison of Germany, France and the United Kingdom.
Maggetti’s (2007) QCA analysis draws explicitly on insights of VoC: in CMEs, the
networks binding decision-makers, regulators and regulatees are denser than in LMEs
because of the need for strategic coordination. Due to sectoral path dependence, a
mode of regulation persists notwithstanding the formal independence granted to an
IRA. Hence, Maggetti’s (2007, p. 274) hypothesis states that “A highly coordinated
economy and sectoral path dependency will be two concomitant conditions for the
low de facto independence of agencies from both the politicians and the regulatees.”
The author relies on a transformed index of coordination created by Hall and Gin-
gerich (2009). He nds that the presence of highly coordinated economies turns out to
be a causally equivalent condition to formal independence, thereby disconrming the
original hypothesis. As there seems to be no eect of path dependence from the prior
mode of regulation, Maggetti (2007, p. 280) conjectures that “the need for coordination
among relevant stakeholders may constitute a reciprocal control, implying that the
politicians cannot critically sway the agencies.”
In his study of Germany, France and Great Britain, Thatcher (2007) arrives to quite
opposite conclusions. First, he draws strong parallels between the VoC and IRA lit-
eratures. He distinguishes between three dierent modes of regulation that emerged
between the 1960s and 1980s and that dovetail with three varieties of capitalism: an
industry model of regulation that emerged in CMEs, a state-led mode of regulation
in countries such as France, an economy characterized by étatisme (a unique mix of
weak organized interests and close state-economy relations, see Hancké et al. 2007,
p. 25), and a regulated competitive market in LMEs. The author considers both the
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formal and actual independence of IRAs. With regard to de iure independence, the
inuence of the EU on the single market is felt everywhere: the formal autonomy of
IRAs increases as most countries converge towards LME-like regulated competition.
However, Thatcher (2007, pp. 168−71) also notes that despite formal EU regulation, na-
tional path dependence matters. IRAs’ actual independence diers across countries, as
in hybrid regimes (France) and CMEs (Germany) the state and industry, respectively,
continue to play a role.
Of the two quantitative analyses, Hanretty and Koop (2013) investigate whether
the coordination of an economy has an eect on the actual independence of regulatory
agencies. Their line of reasoning starts by noting that CMEs are more inimical to reg-
ulatory independence than LMEs, but that, following another argument by Maggetti
(2007, p. 281), “it appears that an agency cannot be a servant of two masters: if it is
scarcely independent from the politicians, it should be highly independent from those
being regulated.” In practice, this means that IRAs should be highly independent from
politicians, but scarcely from regulatees. The hypothesis is, hence, a reversal of the
original argument regarding CMEs, stating that “[t]he more coordinated the market
economy in a country, the higher the degree of actual independence of IRAs” (Han-
retty and Koop 2013, p. 5). The two authors do not nd any signicant correlationwith
an overall coordination index derived from Hall and Gingerich (2009).
Guidi (2014) analyzes one regulatory domain: competition enforcement in the EU.
He investigates why, despite a common regulatory framework, the formal indepen-
dence of national competition agencies in the 27 Member States of the EU varies sub-
stantially. Following Hall and Gingerich (2009), Guidi (2014, p. 349) notes that both
LMEs and CMEs provide a more ecient economic environment than countries with
intermediate levels of coordination. His main hypothesis states that politicians in hy-
brid regimes will grant more independence to competition authorities than CMEs or
LMEs, in order to signal to investors their commitment to regulated competition.
The hump-shaped relationship is founded on well-established insights of Olson’s
(1965) collective action, which state that few uncoordinated actors may generate mar-
ket failures. Employer density, dened as the proportion of wage earners working in
rms organized in employers’ associations (Visser 2011), is used as proxy for the coor-
dination among rms. Not only the hypothesis is conrmed, but also the author nds
out that NCAs in CMEs perform better than those in LMEs, in terms of formal inde-
pendence. A tentative explanation is that CMEs are perceived (or perceive themselves)
as a less favorable business environment than LMEs, a feature that might discourage
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domestic and foreign investors.
Summing up, even though three studies (Guidi 2014; Thatcher 2007; Maggetti 2007)
provide evidence that coordination of the economymatters, there is neither agreement
on the relationship between VoC and IRAs, nor a clear demarcation between the in-
uence of coordination on de iure and de facto independence.
3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
According to Thatcher (2007), national path dependence plays a prominent role in the
development of IRAs across the varieties of capitalism. We contend that this also aects
their formal operational rules. Hence, we develop two pairs of antithetical hypotheses
that connect the IRAs and VoC literatures.
The rst pair, H1a and H1b, pertain to the relationship between the coordination
in corporate governance and the nature of regulation developed in the post-oil-shocks
period. As Hall and Gingerich (2009, pp. 455−456) aptly remark, in CMEs the balance
of inuence on corporate governance tilts towards dominant shareholders, ownership
is relatively concentrated and equity markets are small. So, securing access to external
nance and negotiating corporate control is more likely to involve rms in strategic in-
teractionwithin corporate networks. In LMEs these conditions are reversed: therefore,
issues of nance and corporate control are determined by more competitive markets.
Policy-makers, who are confronted with these dissimilar situations, are aware that
delegation will have distributional consequences, especially in CMEs.
Hence, we envisage two competing arguments linking coordination in corporate
governance to formal independence. H1a contends that politicians ‘accommodate’ the
variety of capitalism and follow the signals sent by dierent types of rms. Capital in
LMEs is impatient, and relies on credible signals to form expectations about future pol-
icy in the sector. As opposed to CMEs, rms in LMEs receive few or no signals about
future policy development from corporate networks in which they may be embedded.
Hence, they must rely on signals sent from a central authority, the IRA, which should
then be granted a higher degree of independence than in CMEs, where corporate net-
works act as informal coordinators.
Therefore, H1a states that CMEs are more inimical to regulatory independence
than LMEs:
H1a: The formal independence granted to regulatory agencies decreases
with the degree of coordination of an economy in corporate governance.
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The second hypothesis posits that politicians ‘react’ to the variety of capitalism. Whereas
LMEs are in the vanguard with respect to the introduction of market coordination
and, consequently, of regulated competition, we expect that rms in CMEs prefer to
retain their industry or state-led modes of regulation. As a side eect, they may enact
sub-optimal regulation that erects barriers to competition or prevents investors from
entering a national market or providing capital for its utilities.
If this is perceived as a legitimate threat by policy-makers, then we expect that
they may establish more, rather than less autonomous regulatory agencies in CMEs
and hybrid regimes to assuage investors.
H1b: The formal independence granted to regulatory agencies increases
with the degree of coordination of an economy in corporate governance.
The second pair of hypotheses (H2a and H2b) follow the same specular logic as H1a
and H1b, but rely on a more rened measure of the rms’ capacity to interact, that
is, on coordination in the labor market. The arguments stem from the insight that
LMEs, characterized by decentralizedmarket coordination, and CMEs, which resort to
centralized strategic coordination, allow for Pareto-superior solutions than economies
that display intermediate levels of coordination and often rely on state for leadership
or mediation. Hence, we do not expect a linear relationship between the degree of
coordination in the labor market and the autonomy of IRAs, as in the case of corpo-
rate governance. This rationale follows the Olsonian (Olson 1965) logic of collective
action that is employed by both the literature on neo-corporatism (cf. Lehmbruch and
Schmitter 1982; Calmfors and Dril 1988) and the following VoC approach (Iversen
1999; Soskice 2007). Both approaches point out that, if not corrected (e.g. due to the
bounded rationality of policy makers), intermediate levels of coordination are most
likely to generate inecient economic outcomes. Before turning to the formulation
of our second pair of hypotheses, we present the application of this logic to monetary
and scal policy.
As for the rst case, Calmfors and Dril (1988) noted a hump-shaped relation-
ship between the centralization of wage bargaining and real wages, which are highest
at intermediate levels of coordination of rms and unions. This generates negative
externalities in the form of lower employment and higher unemployment that have a
snowballing eect on economic performance. According to the authors, “organized in-
terests may be most harmful when they are strong enough to cause major disruptions
but not suciently encompassing to bear any signicant fraction of the costs for soci-
ety of their actions in their own interests” (Calmfors & Dril 1988, p. 15). That is akin
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to saying that intermediate levels of economic coordination produce worse economic
outcomes than either fragmentation or high centralization.
Two decades later, Soskice (2007, pp. 100−102) argued that there is a similar rela-
tionship between the degree of coordination of an economy − decentralized (LMEs),
intermediate and centralized (CMEs) − and the overuse of scal resources. In inter-
mediate cases and in CMEs there are more powerful bargainers (unions, employer as-
sociations) making demands on government expenditures than in LMEs, where these
are fragmented and unable to individually inuence parties or ministries. Moreover,
political systems in CMEs and intermediate regimes appear to be more permeable
to external inuence by interest groups than in LMEs, by virtue of their consensual
decision-making, coalition governments and representative parties (Gourevitch 2003;
Iversen & Soskice 2006). Yet, whereas in CMEs coordinated market actors nd it con-
venient to negotiate among themselves Pareto-optimal agreements, the common pool
problem (the overuse of scal resources) is exacerbated at intermediate levels of co-
ordination, where uncoordinated individually powerful stakeholders have access to
policy-making.
Iversen (1999) and Soskice (2007) nd that various forms of delegation in themacroe-
conomy may mitigate the problems above. In the case of wage bargaining, Iversen
(1999) states that non-accommodating monetary policy, usually requiring indepen-
dent and conservative central banks, reins in the inationary wage spirals common
to intermediately coordinated regimes. By the same token, Soskice (2007) argues that
non-discretionary scal policy (agreed in advance by the coalition partners in govern-
ment or delegated to an autonomous nance minister) best quells the common pool
problem in economies characterized by powerful but uncoordinated market actors.
In both cases, policy-makers are required both to acknowledge the existence of the
problem and to choose whether to delegate part of their macroeconomic policies to
independent institutions or actors.
We hypothesize that a similar logic applies to delegation to IRAs. CMEs are ex-
posed to powerful bargainers (employer associations, trade unions) that strive to pre-
scribe their own regulatory standards, which may at times lead to Pareto-ecient out-
comes. Market actors in LMEs do not self-regulate and are fragmented; hence, their
capacity to request regulation that then creates market failures is more limited. Mixed
regimes display the least favorable setup: intermediately coordinated, powerful indi-
vidual bargainers are unlikely to self-regulate and often require the government or
individual parties to act as brokers or legislate favorable regulation. Hence, their ca-
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pacity to generate negative externalities, such as crowding out domestic or foreign
investment by limiting the credibility of policy is great.
What is then the attitude of policy-makers? In our view it can be again either
‘accommodating’ or ‘reactive’, thereby eliciting dierent responses in the case of in-
termediately coordinated economies and CMEs.
H2a states that policy-makers ‘accommodate’ the variety of capitalism by giving in
to regulatees, thereby ignoring (for example, due to imperfect information) that sub-
optimal outcomes may ensue. In LMEs such decision plays a limited role: due to their
lack of signalling capacity, rms that rely on market coordination by denition require
highly independent IRAs. In CMEs, IRAs can be given relatively high levels of indepen-
dence to signal the arm’s-length relationship with the policy-makers, but given wider
public ownership of enterprises, we may expect lesser overall independence than in
LMEs. Since rms are able to autonomously coordinate, according to Thatcher (2007:
151): “regulatory institutions aid in dealingwith problems of credible commitment and
innovation by allowing industry actors to lead and largely excluding government from
many policy decisions”. In intermediately coordinated economies, instead, powerful
market actors are unable to reach self-regulatory solutions and, hence, require the me-
diation or compensatory action from the state. Political involvement in regulation is
greater, so IRAs are granted minimal autonomy. Therefore:
H2a: The formal independence granted to regulatory agencies when mar-
ket actors are centralized is lower than to when they are decentralized. It
reaches its minimum at intermediate levels of coordination (in the labor
market).
H2b instead posits that decision-makers ‘react’ to the variety of capitalism and realize
that market actors’ pressures to inuence regulation may create an unfavorable busi-
ness climate. Hence, politicians are required to send a strong signal to the business
world by awarding a higher degree of independence to regulatory agencies in polities
characterized by powerful bargainers.
As rms in LMEs rely on market coordination, characterized by free entry and
competition that attracts investment, high autonomy of IRAs is required mainly to
compensate for their lack of signalling capacity. In centralized economies, CMEs,
strategically coordinated employers have the capacity to forge Pareto-optimal agree-
ments that generate few externalities and possibly attract investment in view of their
self-disciplining role. So, signalling through autonomous IRAs is needed, but not as
much as at intermediate levels of coordination, where the probability that sub-optimal
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regulation follows is great. Consequently, policy-makers are here required to grant
the highest independence to IRAs to improve the overall business climate.
H2b: The formal independence granted to regulatory agencies when mar-
ket actors are centralized is higher than to when they are decentralized. It
reaches its maximum at intermediate levels of coordination (in the labor
market).
As a nal remark, we think that if any of the four hypotheses is conrmed by our
analysis, economic coordination has a strong impact on the formal operational rules
of IRAs. If either H2a or H2b are conrmed, then it means that the collective action
capacity of market players inuences the mode of regulation, which is in line with the
wider literature on delegation in the macroeconomy.
4 DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION
Our dependent variable is the formal independence of regulatory agencies. We employ
the index developed (following Cukierman et al. 1992) by Gilardi (2005), which codes
every statutory provision regarding the formal independence of IRAs in 17 European
countries:1 the duration of the appointment of head and board, the possibility to dis-
miss them during their term of oce, their incompatibility with other oces, the obli-
gations vis-à-vis parliament and government, the IRAs’ nancial and organizational
autonomy − to name but a few (for details, see Gilardi 2002; 2005). The data refer to
the IRAs’ institutional settings in the years 2001-2003, covering seven sectors: compe-
tition, electricity, environment, nancial markets, food, pharmaceuticals, and telecom.
Gilardi’s independence index ranges from 0 (regulation carried out by the executive)
to 1 (agency with “full” independence). In practice, there are several zero values in
the data set, but no ‘1’: the maximum value is 0.83, which corresponds to Ireland and
Portugal’s telecom regulators. The mean value across all agencies is 0.42.
In order to test H1 and H2, we operationalize coordination in corporate governance
and coordination in the labor market. The rst relates to the extent to which rms
are controlled via agreements between relevant shareholders and banks, rather than
via market-basedmechanisms. The second measures the level of coordination (among
1 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. We excluded Luxembourg, be-
cause of lack of data for the explanatory variables.
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rms and unions) in wage bargaining, which is an indicator of the strength and en-
compassing character of the coordination of rms vis-à-vis major market actors.2 Fol-
lowing Hall and Gingerich (2009), we collected data on three variables for each type of
coordination. The variables we used are the same as in Hall and Gingerich (2009), but
for four out of six of them we gathered more recent data and used dierent sources.
The two variables for which we used the same sources are: i) shareholder power, mea-
sured as the number of rights that ordinary shareholders enjoy compared to managers
and dominant shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998); ii) dispersion of control, i.e. the per-
centage of ‘widely-held’ (with no dominant shareholders) rms in the economy (La
Porta et al., 1999). The four other variables are: iii) market capitalization, as a percent-
age of GDP;3 iv) labor turnover, measured as the percentage of employees who have
held their jobs for less than one year;4 v) coordination of wage bargaining, measured
on a scale from 1 (fragmented bargaining, at company level) to 5 (economy-wide bar-
gaining);5 vi) dominant wage bargaining level, the main level at which bargaining takes
place, on a scale from 1 (company level) to 5 (national level).6
FollowingHall and Gingerich (2009), we run a conrmatory factor analysis in order
to test whether the operationalization we propose is consistent. Our expectation is
that the rst three indicators (shareholder power, dispersion of control and market
capitalization) should load on one factor, that is coordination in corporate governance,
and the three other indicators (labor turnover, coordination of wage bargaining and
dominant wage bargaining level) should load on another factor, that is coordination
in the labor market. The set-up of the conrmatory factor analysis is represented in
Figure 1. Table 1 shows the coecients of the six parameters with respect to the two
latent variables.
2 Guidi (2014) uses employer density instead, which is, however, unavailable for a signicant portion
of years and countries considered in this study.
3 Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS) and Euro-
stat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_gdp_c&lang=en), data retrieved on
February 2014. For our index, we took the mean across the period 1990-2002.
4 Source: OECD iLibrary, data retrieved on 23 May 2013. Mean value across the period 1992-2002.
5 Source: Visser (2011), based on Kenworthy (2001). Mean value across the period 1990-2002.
6 Source: Visser (2011). Mean value across the period 1990-2002.
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Fig. 1: Set up of the conrmatory factor analysis
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Parameters Coecients
λ1 0.530
(0.367)
λ2 0.162***
(0.062)
λ3 0.305***
(0.108)
λ4 -31.492**
(13.195)
λ5 0.839***
(0.203)
λ6 0.791***
(0.184)
Model χ2 = 15.281; df = 8; Pr > χ2 = 0.054
N=16 Goodness-of-t index = 0.8
Tab. 1: Parameter estimates of the two indices of coordination (conrmatory factor
analysis)
As we can see, the only parameter for which the relationship with the latent vari-
able is rather weak is the rst, related to the shareholder power indicator. For all the
others, the correlation is signicant and has the expected sign, positive for all param-
eters except for that of labor turnover.7 From the factor scores we derive the indices
of coordination in corporate governance and coordination in the labor market.8
The results, shown in Figure 2, reveal a lower-than-expectedclustering of countries
around similar levels of coordination in industrial relations and corporate governance,
which may indicate we are in the presence of an LME (if both score low) or a CME (if
both score high). The regression line indicates that the correlation between the two
variables is positive but relatively weak (0.42). It signicantly improves (0.7) if we re-
move France and Ireland, whose corporate governance and labor market coordination
scores diverge. As we treat the two coordination variables separately, the results are
7 Indeed, the uidity of labor markets decreases with coordination.
8 The inverse of the scores of the rst factor have been taken for coordination in corporate governance.
The scores of the second factor have been taken for coordination in labor market. We have rescaled both
variables to have a [0; 1] range.
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presented individually.
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Fig. 2: Scatter plot of the indices of coordination in corporate governance and in the
labor market
Coordination in corporate governance is minimal (below 0.333) in the UK, Ire-
land and Switzerland, whose level of coordination is, according to Hall and Gingerich
(2009, p. 459), underestimated by the indicators employed. This means that Switzer-
land would appear less coordinated than it actually is. Afonso and Mach (2011, p. 105)
note instead that there was “a clear breakdown of the Swiss intercompany network (in-
terlocking directorates) during the 1990s”, and greater emphasis placed on shareholder
value. Intermediate coordination (0.334 to 0.666) is found in Finland, the Netherlands
and, very near to the threshold, in Denmark and Sweden. Interestingly, all of the
countries in the low and intermediate brackets are either private pension fund veter-
ans or have recently boosted their capital markets through quasi-mandatory pension
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fund aliation (see Ebbinghaus 2011). All other countries score above 0.667, which
is in line with a more traditional CME setup. Some of the highest scores are taken up
by Mediterranean countries, which may be attributable to a rather sclerotic type of
managerial capitalism.
As for the coordination in the labor market, only the UK, a prototypical LME,
scores low in the distribution (below 0.333). At intermediate levels of coordination
(0.334 to 0.666) lie Switzerland, whose system of industrial relations is considered a
very light/liberal variant of corporatism (Afonso and Mach 2011, p. 113; Bartle 2006),
Denmark, which has decentralized its industrial relations, plus two Southern countries
(Portugal and Spain) that are typically included into a hybrid category, characterized
by weak coordination. France falls by a small margin within the intermediate cate-
gory, as its industrial relations “came to resemble those of market capitalist Britain”
(Schmidt 2003, p. 535). Above the 0.667mark, we nd the bulk of our countries. Most of
them are CMEs that still rely on highly coordinated bargaining: Belgium, Finland, the
Netherlands and Norway. However, there has been a tendency towards more decen-
tralized coordination in some former CME strongholds, namely in Austria, Germany
and Sweden. It is important to note that the latter two experienced their worst crises
in post-war history during the 1990s (reunication in Germany and banking in Swe-
den), which required the adoption of extensive market-oriented reform programmes.
The presence of three countries is more surprising. Greece, where employer asso-
ciation members are obliged to participate in collective bargaining agreements, and
Italy, whose centralization in bargaining peaked in the late 1990s, are still includable
in a Southern model (see below). Ireland, usually depicted as an LME, instead be-
came famous for eight nation-wide ‘social partnership programmes’ agreed between
the government, unions, employers, farming bodies and civil society organization dur-
ing 1987-2008 (see O’Donnell et al. 2011).
In sum, our indicators present the following picture. The UK is the only pure
LME, where overall coordination is lowest. Higher levels of strategic coordination are
found in traditional CMEs found in most Continental Europe and in Scandinavia with
several cases that recorded a movement towards liberalism in their coordination ca-
pacity, either in corporate governance (Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden) or in
the labor market (Austria, Germany and Sweden). Southern countries still represent
a rather homogeneous cluster, where the coordination in the labor market is lower
than in corporate governance, and which may represent a distinct variety of capital-
ism, characterized by the compensating state. At the same time, this divergence is in
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France much wider, which is in line with Hancké et al.’s (2007) denition of étatisme.
Two countries are somewhere halfway between market and strategic coordination:
Denmark and Switzerland. Denmark is usually termed a hybrid case of ‘negotiated
economy’, where the “institutionalized collective learning and decisionmaking among
rms, workers, policymakers, and others – a mainstay of CMEs [...] – was decentral-
ized in ways reminiscent of LMEs” (Campbell & Pedersen 2007, p. 309). Switzerland
was also traditionally a leanCME, which has quite dramatically decentralized andmar-
ketized due to international pressures and unprecedented stagnation during the 1990s
(Afonso & Mach 2011). Finally, it is important to mention that the inconsistency with
Hall and Gingerich (2009, p. 458) regarding Ireland, the major outlier, is attributable to
the period of reference, as our data captures the extensive social pacting of the 1990s.
In testing our hypotheses, we also employ several control variables. The rst is the
replacement risk (Franzese 2002), that is the risk that a government faces of being re-
placed by another executivewith dierent political preferences. This indicator is found
to be positively related to formal independence by Gilardi (2008, p. 64), as politicians
want to protect their policy choices from the risk that future incumbents will modify
them. The higher the formal independence of the agencies, the more dicult is to
inuence their regulatory decisions. Our operationalization is slightly dierent from
that of Gilardi (2008, p. 147), in that we use a dierent source, the ParlGov database
(Döring & Manow 2012), to calculate the yearly risk.9 Another variable potentially
aecting the decision to delegate to IRAs is the number of veto players (Gilardi 2002;
2008). Like regulatory agencies, veto players serve as stabilizers of the policy out-
put (see Tsebelis 2002). A political system with many veto players is, all else equal,
less likely to face sudden changes of the regulatory environment. As policy stability,
which “mitigate[s] both the credibility and the political uncertainty problems” (Gilardi
2005, p. 139), is one of the main reasons for which IRAs are established, we expect the
presence of veto players to have a negative impact on regulatory agencies’ indepen-
dence.10 Our proxy for veto players is the variable checks in the Database of Political
Institutions (Beck et al. 2001; Keefer & Stasavage 2003).11
9 The replacement risk is operationalized as the product of hazard rate (the inverse of government
duration) and political polarization. The latter is calculated, for each year, as the standard deviation of
the governments’ position on a left-right scale in the 7-year period including the previous 5 years, the
year of interest, and the year after. The left-right position of each executive is calculated as a weighted
mean of the parties supporting the government. We thank Chris Hanretty for providing us with the code
for calculating the replacement risk (see: http://goo.gl/g1rHpR). For each country, we use the mean value
across the 1990-2002 period.
10 This has been conrmed by Gilardi (2002, 2005, 2008).
11 For our analysis, we calculated the mean value across the 1990-2002 period.
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We also control for the sector in which each regulatory agency operates. This
choice derives from the expectation that not in all sectors politicians need to confer
the same amount of independence in order to send a credible message to the mar-
ket. Various studies conrm that the ‘need of credibility’ is higher in capital-intensive
sectors, such as telecommunications or nancial markets, than in pharmaceutical or
food safety regulation (see Gilardi 2002, 2005; Elgie & MacMenamin 2005; Wonka &
Rittberger 2010). Since the grouping and operationalization of policy sectors varies
considerably in the literature, we chose the simplest option and use a dummy variable
for each sector covered in Gilardi’s data set. Other variables that we employ to con-
trol for state intervention in the economy are government spending and government
debt as a percentage of GDP.12 Since several contribution in VoC theory point to the
existence of a ‘state-led’ type of capitalism, we want to check if higher levels of state
intervention are associated with higher IRA independence. Finally, we control for the
economic13 and demographic size of the countries.14
5 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
As the agencies whose independence we aim to explain are nested in countries, we
test the impact of the explanatory variables with multilevel regression models. We
test our rst couple of rival hypotheses with the following linear mixed model (Model
1 in Table 2):
INDij = β0 + β1(CCGij) + β2(S
1
ij) + ...+ β7(S
6
ij) + β8 log(GDPij) +
+β9 log(POPij) + uj + eij
where IND is the formal independence of regulator i in country j, CCG is coor-
dination in corporate governance, the variables fromS1 toS6 are the dummy variables
for the sectors,15 GDP is the gross domestic product, POP is the population, u is the
country-level random intercept and e is the error term. In this model, we estimate
12 World Development Indicators (World Bank 2013), mean across the 1990-2002 period (government
spending) and 1995-2002 period (debt).
13 Gross domestic product at market prices, Eurostat data (accessed on 20 January 2014), 1990-2002
mean.
14 Total population on 1 January, Eurostat data (accessed on 20 January 2014), 1990-2002 mean.
15 The sector dummies included in the regression are: competition, energy, environment, nancial
markets, food safety, and telecom. The pharmaceutical sector is used as baseline category.
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the impact of coordination in corporate governance on the formal independence of
IRAs. We hypothesized a negative eect of coordination in corporate governance on
independence in Hypothesis H1a, and a positive eect in Hypothesis H1b; therefore,
a negative β1 coecient will conrm H1a, and a positive coecient will conrm H1b.
To test the second hypothesis, we use instead the following model (Model 2 in
Table 2):
INDij = β0 + β1(CLMij) + β2(CLM
2
ij) + β3(S
1
ij) + ...+ β8(S
6
ij) +
+β9 log(GDPij) + β10 log(POPij) + uj + eij
in which CLM is coordination in the labor market. The controls are the same
as in the previous regression. Since both H2a and H2b hypothesize a non-linear rela-
tionship between coordination in the labor market and independence, we include the
square ofCLM as well. Being more specic, we will conrm H2a if β1 is negative and
β2 is positive; vice versa, we will conrm H2b. In Model 3, we include both indicators
of coordination, while in Model 4 we add the two controls pertaining to political in-
stitutions: replacement risk and veto players. To test the impact of state intervention
in the economy, in Model 5 we add two further regressors, government spending and
government debt as a percentage of national GDP. Finally, with Model 6 we test what
we deem to be the best specication, including the ‘political institutions’ controls and
excluding coordination in corporate governance and state intervention controls. The
results of the regression models are shown in Table 2.
In Model 1, we nd that the coecient of coordination in corporate governance is
not signicant, thereby not conrming either H1a or H1b. All other models lead us to
conrm H2a and disconrm H2b: overall, the coecient of coordination in the labor
market is negative, and that of its square is positive (both are signicant at less than
0.01 in all models). When both explanatory variables are included (Model 3), coordi-
nation in corporate governance is still not signicant, while the U-shaped relationship
between coordination in the labor market and independence is conrmed. When the
two indicators of political institutions (veto players and replacement risk) are added
to the previous regressors (Model 4), we see an improvement in the overall t of the
model: while the veto players coecient is not signicant, replacement risk appears
to positively aect regulatory independence, in accordance with Gilardi’s (2008) nd-
ings; the estimates of the two indices of coordination are not sensibly aected. Only
in Model 5, where we do not detect any impact of either government spending or debt
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Tab. 2: Multilevel regression models
Dependent variable: formal independence of regulatory agencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coord. corp. gov. −0.115 (0.102) 0.102 (0.120) −0.197 (0.126) −0.221∗ (0.129)
Coord. lab. mark. −0.911∗∗∗ (0.293) −1.105∗∗∗ (0.365) −0.929∗∗∗ (0.304) −0.864∗∗∗ (0.307) −1.197∗∗∗ (0.255)
Coord. lab. mark. (sq.) 0.728∗∗∗ (0.264) 0.835∗∗∗ (0.286) 0.835∗∗∗ (0.239) 0.801∗∗∗ (0.241) 0.956∗∗∗ (0.229)
Sector: competition 0.017 (0.066) 0.022 (0.065) 0.024 (0.065) 0.024 (0.063) 0.021 (0.063) 0.026 (0.064)
Sector: electricity 0.140∗∗ (0.061) 0.141∗∗ (0.061) 0.142∗∗ (0.061) 0.134∗∗ (0.059) 0.135∗∗ (0.058) 0.137∗∗ (0.059)
Sector: environment −0.177∗∗∗ (0.066) −0.180∗∗∗ (0.065) −0.179∗∗∗ (0.065) −0.184∗∗∗ (0.063) −0.183∗∗∗ (0.063) −0.182∗∗∗ (0.064)
Sector: nanc. mark. 0.153∗∗ (0.063) 0.151∗∗ (0.063) 0.154∗∗ (0.063) 0.151∗∗ (0.061) 0.152∗∗ (0.060) 0.155∗∗ (0.061)
Sector: food safety −0.171∗∗∗ (0.064) −0.170∗∗∗ (0.064) −0.167∗∗∗ (0.064) −0.170∗∗∗ (0.062) −0.168∗∗∗ (0.061) −0.163∗∗∗ (0.062)
Sector: telecom 0.237∗∗∗ (0.062) 0.236∗∗∗ (0.062) 0.238∗∗∗ (0.062) 0.233∗∗∗ (0.060) 0.233∗∗∗ (0.059) 0.237∗∗∗ (0.060)
Gov’t expenditure 0.006 (0.005)
Debt over GDP −0.0003 (0.001)
Veto players 0.026 (0.018) 0.018 (0.020) 0.020 (0.018)
Replacement risk 0.270∗∗∗ (0.086) 0.258∗∗∗ (0.096) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.073)
log(GDP) −0.018 (0.127) −0.036 (0.094) 0.007 (0.104) −0.246∗∗ (0.113) −0.241∗ (0.134) −0.132 (0.088)
log(population) 0.005 (0.113) 0.003 (0.081) −0.048 (0.099) 0.174∗ (0.105) 0.176 (0.122) 0.058 (0.075)
Intercept 0.606 (0.440) 1.023∗∗ (0.450) 1.337∗∗ (0.576) 0.750 (0.519) 0.565 (0.549) 1.262∗∗∗ (0.408)
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102
Log Likelihood 30.776 34.088 34.444 40.683 41.358 39.472
Akaike Inf. Crit. −37.551 −42.176 −40.887 −49.367 −46.717 −48.944
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −6.052 −8.052 −4.138 −7.367 0.533 −9.569
Note: Number of countries: 16. Variance components estimated with maximum-likelihood procedure. Estimates’ signicance: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
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on agencies’ independence, the coecient of coordination in corporate governance is
signicant and negative, thus apparently conrming H1a. However, we are cautious
in giving too much credence to the results of a model that is not particularly parsimo-
nious or ecient (as indicated by the highest BIC). As already said, Model 6 seems to
be the best specication.
Estimates and confidence intervals of coordination in labour market
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Fig. 3: Estimates and 95% condence intervals of coordination in the labor market in
models from 2 to 6, and averaged coecients
The most important eect highlighted by our statistical analysis is the U-shaped
relationship between coordination in the labor market and agency independence. As
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Table 2 illustrates, the eect is constant across dierent model specication. Figure
3 shows the coecients of coordination in the labor market and its square in Models
from 2 to 6. On the right side of the graph, we can observe the average coecients,
weighted by the AIC of the models, the BIC, and with no weighting. The fact that
the coecients of coordination in the labor market and its square have the same sign
and signicance regardless of dierent specications leads us to consider this eect as
robust.16 Also running the models after removing particularly inuential cases does
not aect the results.17
The impact of coordination in the labor market on independence of regulatory
agencies is summarized in Figure 4. We can observe a relationship between coordi-
nation in the labor market and independence that takes the U-shaped form predicted
in H2a: where market coordination among rms prevails, IRAs are very independent
(expected independence equals 0.74); where there is strategic coordination between
rms and unions, agencies are signicantly less independent (0.47); in countries that
lie at the centre of the distribution, we have some of the least independent agencies
(0.36).18
6 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The results of our statistical analysis conrm that the VoC framework adds consider-
able explanatory power to the analysis of IRA autonomy (see Thatcher 2007, p. 148),
and that this is not conned to the regulatory agencies’ informal operational rules.
H2a suggests that there is overlap between types of economic coordination and com-
plementarymodes of regulation. Where rms rely on market-based coordination (typ-
ically in LMEs), there is a higher demand for institutions that guarantee fair competi-
tion and a stable regulatory environment, and therefore IRAs independence is high.19
Where rms coordinate among themselves and with other powerful market actors,
such as trade unions (in CMEs), there is less need to rely on market-based mecha-
16 See Plümper and Neumayer (2014) for a thorough discussion of robustness tests and their interpre-
tation in political science.
17 We calculated the Cook’s distance for each agency and used the customary 4/(N−k−1) threshold
to identify inuential cases.
18 Expected values of independence for values of coordination in labormarket ranging from 0 to 1 have
been calculated through stochastic simulation using the functionmvrnorm (Venables and Ripley 2002) in
R (R Core Team 2013). These values have been used for the graph in Figure 4.
19 Within Gilardi’s dataset, the UK is the sole LME. Qualitative studies, however, suggest that other
LMEs, such as Canada and New Zealand (see Hall and Gingerich 2009, p. 458), establish similarly au-
tonomous IRAs (Aucoin 2006; Gregory 2006).
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nisms, and hence IRAs can be less independent. Moreover, in intermediately coordi-
nated regimes IRAs are, all else equal, even less likely to be autonomous, possibly by
virtue of the more discretionary mediating or coordinating role played by the state.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
.3
0
.4
0
.5
0
.6
0
.7
0
.8
Coordination in labour market
IR
A
s
 i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
Fig. 4: Impact of coordination in the labor market on regulatory agencies’ indepen-
dence (Model 6)
Obviously, these are average eects, and the impact of other variables must also
be considered when looking at single countries. Countries like France or Italy, which
are usually categorized as intermediately coordinated regimes, where the state plays
a major role, have rather more autonomous IRAs than one would expect. At the other
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end, some archetypical CMEs are either latecomers that established few IRAs (Austria)
or have systematically set up scarcely autonomous agencies (Germany). How can these
divergences be explained?
As for the rst two countries, the explanation is simple: their respective replace-
ment risks are the highest in the sample, leading to high de iure independence. Addi-
tionally, France is a rather unique case of étatisme within European modes of capital-
ism as it combines close state-economy relations with very fragmented market actors,
which in our framework require independent signalling. However, it has been well
documented that the high de iure autonomy of France and Italy’s IRAs is only partly
reected in de facto autonomy. Even though France moved from étatisme to regulated
competition, it maintained state-led policy to create international champions through
re-regulation and informal networks at home (Thatcher 2007, pp. 162−163). In Italy,
instead, widespread politicization is what reduces IRAs’ supposed actual autonomy
(Thatcher 2002b, p. 959−960).
The two German-speaking countries represent a more intricate puzzle, which may
require in-depth case study analysis to be solved. It is possible, in fact, that politicians
in the two countries either have somuch faith in their respective self-regulatingmarket
actors that they never contemplated establishing very independent regulatory agen-
cies in the rst place, or believe that even if endowed with scarce formal autonomy,
IRAs may achieve in time enough reputation for impartiality. Regarding Germany, it
has also been argued that the Germans are “very cautious of setting up IAAs [Inde-
pendent Administrative Authorities] due to the constitutional principle of democracy”
(van Aaken 2004, p. 91). Even if independence is deemed to be important, German
administrative law leaves little room for delegation, thereby prescribing ministerial
oversight. This results in low formal independence for German IRAs, although their
de facto independence appears to be high.
That said, the U-shaped relationship illustrated in Figure 4 holds for most coun-
tries in the sample, and it can also be observed in most sectors, such as in electricity,
nancial services, environment, food or telecommunications (whose dummies are all
signicant at less than 0.05 level in all models). In the following paragraphs, we show
this tendency by comparing agencies from dierent countries in one sector pertaining
to economic regulation (electricity) and in a social regulation sector (food safety); we
also briey analyze the results for the competition sector, whose dummy is statistically
not signicant in all models.
If we look at the electricity sector, where independence is highly valued, the regu-
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lator in the only LME, the UK, has an independence score of 0.64 (very high, although
not themost independentwithin the sample), while the average independence in inter-
mediately coordinated countries is 0.46, and in highly coordinated ones 0.57. A cursory
glance at the growing comparative literature on this sector lends some credence to the
mechanisms underpinning our hypotheses.
As for Great Britain, the neo-liberal and unconstrained conservative government
of Margaret Thatcher proceeded with the privatization and restructuring of the elec-
tricity industry at breathtaking speed (Bartle 2002, p. 11). The new commitment to
regulated competition required a highly independent regulator, originally called Of-
ce of Electricity Regulation (established in 1989). Moving towards intermediately
coordinated cases, we can see a wide divergence in the mechanisms leading to the del-
egation to IRAs. In Switzerland, a ‘liberal corporatist’ country, the failure to establish
a regulator is at least partly attributable to the imperfect coordination of rms in the
electricity sector. Larger and smaller companies disagreed on the extent of liberaliza-
tion and the unions neatly opposed it. This ambiguous stance has been backed by the
Swiss electricity supply association, which asked for a slow process and for compen-
sation to losers (Bartle 2006, pp. 16−18). Only in 2008 the sector was liberalized and an
independent agency (ElCom) was established. However, asMaggetti et al. (2011, p. 205)
note, “traditional patterns of auto-regulation by private actors have been particularly
resilient”. In Spain, an economy characterized by corporate statism and close state-
business links, the electricity market was dominated by private suppliers that limited
the role of the state until the 1970s, when the government increasingly started to take
over. Even though there is evidence that Spain moved towards competition and inde-
pendent regulation during the Socialist governments headed by Felipe González (1982-
96), progress has been slow and ineective. The relevant IRA, the Comisión Nacional
de Energía, was awarded only advisory functions and an intermediate level of formal
independence (0.44) (Jordana et al. 2006, p. 453). Leaving aside the German paradox
(Gilardi 2008, p. 127), where there was no regulator until the mid-2000s, in CMEs there
is considerable variation. However, even where IRA autonomy is at its maximum the
inuence of corporatism is still felt. In Belgium the electricity sector was consensually
administered by the Control Committee for Electricity and Gas, a proper corporatist
institution that comprised representatives of industry, unions, as well as national and
regional authorities, up until 2003. This has now changed: the newly established Com-
mission for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas is very autonomous (highest score
in the sample, 0.75), however, it mainly has advisory functions and is continuously
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assisted by industry representatives (Verhoest & Sys 2006).
In the food safety sectorwe nd, in accordancewith the literature, lower degrees of
formal independence than in the electricity sector. However, the U-shaped relationship
is clearly observable: the British agency scores 0.41, while the average independence
for intermediately coordinated countries is 0.09, and that for coordinated economies
is 0.24.
The UK’s food safety agency (Food Standards Agency, FSA) was established in
1999. The event that triggered the creation of the agency, like in other countries, was
the epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (usually known as the “mad cow
disease”), whose transmission from cows to humans was proven in the second half
of the 1990s. However, the (neo-)liberal principles that inspired the establishment of
the FSA were pointed out explicitly in the white paper that the Blair Government
presented to the parliament ahead of discussing the proposal. The government, in
particular, stated that its aim was to avoid “conicts of interest within MAFF [Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food] arising from its dual responsibility for protecting
public health and for sponsoring the agriculture and food industries” (UK Government
1998, p. 6). The stress on the need to protect consumers and to prevent producers from
seeking protection from the government is typical of a LME. Among intermediately
coordinated economies, no independent food agency was present in 2001-2003 (and
until today) in Denmark, Switzerland, and Portugal. France established its food agency
(Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des aliments) in 1999, Spain (Agencia Española de
Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutrición) in 2002. Both agencies were later merged with
other bodies (the French agency in 2010, the Spanish one in 2014). In France, although
the agency was established in the same year as in Great Britain, the emphasis was
less on avoiding conicts of interest and more on the technical expertise needed for
supervising food security (Benamouzig and Besançon, 2005). Regarding coordinated
economies, we observe a signicant variance. In some countries (Belgium, Sweden,
Finland) the food agency is very independent, while several other countries do not
even have one. This demonstrates that the impact of economic coordination needs to
be further investigated, and that more qualitative studies on social sector regulation
are highly desirable.
Finally, our study does not reveal a U-shaped relationship for the competition sec-
tor, which is indeed the only non-signicant dummy in all models. Although the sam-
ple of competition agencies in Gilardi’s dataset is too small to draw general conclu-
sions, CMEs award on average less independence (0.37) than hybrid regimes (0.44) (no
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competition agencies from LMEs are present in this dataset). This nding is compat-
ible with Guidi’s (2014) analysis of the formal independence of national competition
agencies in the EU. Guidi’s results point out that countries with an intermediate level
of coordination tend to have more independent competition agencies than countries
with high and low degrees of coordination. As competition is not a ‘sector’ in the
strict sense but rather an overarching framework of market rules, a dierent logic of
delegation may apply. In line with Guidi (2014) and our hypothesis H2b, politicians
may, in contrast to the general ndings of our analysis, ‘react’ and use delegation to
compensate for market failures, which are most prominent in intermediate cases of
market coordination.20
Concluding this brief qualitative analysis of the results, we want to emphasize that
our study must be read as a picture of the rst years of the 2000s. As has been shown,
several countries have established regulators after 2003, and others have merged them
after their creation. Economic and social regulation undergoes a continuous redef-
inition, which aects both the norms and the organizations in charge of enforcing
them. The determinants of these changes may be of dierent kinds. For instance, in
the case of Germany’s electricity sector, a signicant role in nally delegating powers
to an IRA has been played both by EU pressure due to the enforcement of Directive
2003/54/EC (which required Member States to regulate the energy market through an
ad hoc agency) and by the ineciency of previous self-regulatory practices. In 2003-5,
the German government rst announced and then delegated regulatory competencies
in the energy domain to the telecoms regulator, which later became the Bundesnet-
zagentur (BNA), a sort of regulatory hub for all network industries (Gilardi 2008, pp.
128−31; Müller 2006). A similar process (see above) has occurred in Switzerland. These
cases may point to a process of learning, as it happened over the past decades in cen-
tral banking. Countries can establish IRAs or reform them after recognizing the failure
or the ineciency of previous arrangements. Yet, innovations can also take place be-
cause the type of economic system changes: for example, a country that reforms its
corporate and employment policies so as to make them more liberal might create in-
dependent regulators or make those already existing more independent, in line with
our theoretical model. This can only be ascertained by gathering more recent data
on the independence of regulatory agencies, and comparing them with the ‘snapshot’
20 The divergence may also be attributed to the dierences in the research design of the two studies,
notably the indicators employed for the indices (employer density instead of coordination in labormarket)
and the dierent sample, which in Guidi (2014) includes all EU Member States and for the year 2009 (not
2001-03 as in Gilardi’s data).
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analyzed in this article.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have sought to establish a link between varieties of capitalism and
the institutional design of regulatory institutions. The VoC approach predicts that
“nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the economy should
tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres as well” (Hall & Soskice,
2001: 18). Hence, our article aimed to answer the following question: is there a re-
lationship between modes of coordination in the economic sphere and the degree of
independence from politics granted to regulatory agencies?
We have identied two distinct dimensions in which economies diverge: the rst
relates to the embeddedness in corporate networks, the second to the collective action
capacity of its major market actors. By testing the impact of coordination in corporate
governance and coordination in the labor market on the formal independence of reg-
ulators in 16 European countries, we have found out that the latter helps us explain
why regulatory agencies are more independent in some countries than in others. This
conrms that there is coupling between economic and regulatory regimes and that this
is not conned to the informal operational rules of regulatory agencies. Our analysis
not only shows that IRAs in highly centralized CMEs are, on average, less indepen-
dent than in LMEs, but also that economies with an intermediate level of coordination
among rms are expected to endow regulatory agencies with the lowest degrees of
independence. In other words, where coordination is present but rather poor, the gov-
ernment and the parliament retain more discretion in regulatory policies.
These ndings both have policy implications and open new and exciting venues
for research. With respect to the recommendations by international organizations (EU,
OECD) to establish independent regulatory agencies, the article shows that during the
1990s and early 2000s, when IRAs were still in their infancy, dierences in their de-
sign reected not only political, but also economic factors. As it happened with other
macroeconomic institutions, the degrees of coordination of an economy and of regu-
latory agency independence may interact and produce Pareto inecient solutions. In
such case, policy-makersmay undergo a learning process, as it happened, for example,
for the electricity sector in Germany or in Switzerland, and drastically reconsider the
rules governing some of their IRAs.
As for academic considerations, further research can develop at least into three
directions. First, the natural extension of our analysis would be to test the relation-
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ship between coordination and de facto independence, as more data on IRAs’ actual
autonomy are becoming available. Second, we think that the notion that IRAs are a
constituent part of the VoC architecture calls for further investigation. In fact, the role
and importance of regulatory agencies in the overall coherence of dierent economic
regimes has been almost entirely left out from the scholarship dealing with varieties of
capitalism. Finally, asmentioned above, we think that the relationship between coordi-
nation and independence is neither exclusive nor time-invariant. Regulatory agencies
are a relatively recent phenomenon that is rapidly evolving. As policy-makers revise
and rene their preferences, it would be of foremost importance to gather updated
qualitative and quantitative data on the current functioning of IRAs and compare them
with the situation in the early 2000s.
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